philosophy of artificial intelligence see also ethics of artificial intelligence artificial intelligence has close connections with philosophy because both share several concepts and these include intelligence action consciousness epistemology and even free will these factors contributed to the emergence of the philosophy of artificial intelligence some scholars argue that the ai communitys dismissal of philosophy is detrimental the philosophy of artificial intelligence attempts to answer such questions as follows can a machine act intelligently can it solve any problem that a person would solve by thinking are human intelligence and machine intelligence the same is the human brain essentially a computer can a machine have a mind mental states and consciousness in the same way that a human being can can it feel how things are these three questions reflect the divergent interests of ai researchers linguists cognitive scientists and philosophers respectively the scientific answers to these questions depend on the definition of intelligence and consciousness and exactly which machines are under discussion important propositions in the philosophy of ai include turings polite convention if a machine behaves as intelligently as a human being then it is as intelligent as a human being the dartmouth proposal every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it newell and simons physical symbol system hypothesis a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action searles strong ai hypothesis the appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds hobbes mechanism for reason is nothing but reckoning that is adding and subtracting of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts can a machine display general intelligence is it possible to create a machine that can solve all the problems humans solve using their intelligence this question defines the scope of what machines will be able to do in the future and guides the direction of ai research it only concerns the behavior of machines and ignores the issues of interest to psychologists cognitive scientists and philosophers to answer this question it does not matter whether a machine is really thinking as a person thinks or is just acting like it is thinking the basic position of most ai researchers is summed up in this statement which appeared in the proposal for the dartmouth workshop of 1956 every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it arguments against the basic premise must show that building a working ai system is impossible because there is some practical limit to the abilities of computers or that there is some special quality of the human mind that is necessary for thinking and yet cannot be duplicated by a machine or by the methods of current ai research arguments in favor of the basic premise must show that such a system is possible the first step to answering the question is to clearly define intelligence intelligence the standard interpretation of the turing test turing test turing test alan turing turings test extends this polite convention to machines if a machine acts as intelligently as human being then it is as intelligent as a human being one criticism of the turing test is that it is explicitly anthropomorphic intelligent agent definition simple reflex agent recent ai research defines intelligence in terms of intelligent agents an agent is something which perceives and acts in an environment a performance measure defines what counts as success for the agent if an agent acts so as to maximize the expected value of a performance measure based on past experience and knowledge then it is intelligent definitions like this one try to capture the essence of intelligence they have the advantage that unlike the turing test they do not also test for human traits that we arguments that a machine can display general intelligence the brain can be simulated artificial brain an mri scan of a normal adult human brain hubert dreyfus describes this argument as claiming that if the nervous system obeys the laws of physics and chemistry which we have every reason to suppose it does then we ought to be able to reproduce the behavior of the nervous system with some physical device and it took 50 days to simulate 1 second of brain dynamics on a cluster of 27 processors few however searle points out that in principle anything can be simulated by a computer thus bringing the definition to its breaking point leads to the conclusion that any process at all can technically be considered computation what we wanted to know is what distinguishes the mind from thermostats and livers he writes human thinking is symbol processing physical symbol system in 1963 allen newell and herbert a simon proposed that symbol manipulation was the essence of both human and machine intelligence they wrote a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action this claim is very strong it implies both that human thinking is a kind of symbol manipulation because a symbol system is necessary for intelligence and that machines can be intelligent because a symbol system is sufficient for intelligence another version of this position was described by philosopher hubert dreyfus who called it the psychological assumption the mind can be viewed as a device operating on bits of information according to formal rules a distinction is usually made arguments against symbol processing these arguments show that human thinking does not consist solely of high level symbol manipulation they do not show that artificial intelligence is impossible only that more than symbol processing is required gdelian antimechanist arguments mechanism philosophy gdelian arguments in 1931 kurt gdel proved with an incompleteness theorem that it is always possible to construct a gdel statement that a given consistent formal system of logic such as a highlevel symbol manipulation program could not prove despite being a true statement the constructed gdel statement is unprovable in the given system the truth of the constructed gdel statement is contingent on the consistency of the given system applying the same process to a subtly inconsistent system will appear to succeed but will actually yield a false gdel statement instead however the modern consensus in the scientific and mathematical community is that actual human reasoning is inconsistent that any consistent idealized version h of human reasoning would logically be forced to adopt a healthy but counterintuitive openminded skepticism about the consistency of h otherwise h is provably inconsistent and that gdels theorems do not lead to any valid argument that humans have mathematical reasoning capabilities beyond what a machine could ever duplicate more pragmatically russell and norvig note that gdels argument only applies to what can theoretically be proved given an infinite amount of memory and time in practice real machines including humans have finite resources and will have difficulty proving many theorems it is not necessary to prove everything in order to be intelligent less formally douglas hofstadter in his pulitzer prize winning book gdel escher bach an eternal golden braid states that these gdelstatements always refer to the system itself drawing an analogy to the way the epimenides paradox uses statements that refer to themselves such as this statement is false or i am lying but of course the epimenides paradox applies to anything that makes statements whether they are machines or humans even lucas himself consider lucas cant assert the truth of this statement this statement is true but cannot be asserted by lucas this shows that lucas himself is subject to the same limits that he describes for machines as are all people and so lucass argument is pointless after concluding that human reasoning is noncomputable penrose went on to controversially speculate that some kind of hypothetical noncomputable processes involving the collapse of quantum mechanical states give humans a special advantage over existing computers existing quantum computers are only capable of reducing the complexity of turing computable tasks and are still restricted to tasks within the scope of turing machines dreyfus the primacy of unconscious skills dreyfus critique of artificial intelligence hubert dreyfus argued that human intelligence and expertise depended primarily on unconscious instincts rather than conscious symbolic manipulation and argued that these unconscious skills would never be captured in formal rules dreyfuss argument had been anticipated by turing in his 1950 paper computing machinery and intelligence where he had classified this as the argument from the informality of behavior russell and norvig point out that in the years since dreyfus published his critique progress has been made towards discovering the rules that govern unconscious reasoning can a machine have a mind consciousness and mental states this is a philosophical question related to the problem of other minds and the hard problem of consciousness the question revolves around a position defined by john searle as strong ai a physical symbol system can have a mind and mental states searle distinguished this position from what he called weak ai a physical symbol system can act intelligently searle introduced the terms to isolate strong ai from weak ai so he could focus on what he thought was the more interesting and debatable issue he argued that even if we assume that we had a computer program that acted exactly like a human mind there would still be a difficult philosophical question that needed to be answered neither of searles two positions are of great concern to ai research since they do not directly answer the question can a machine display general intelligence unless it can also be shown that consciousness is necessary for intelligence turing wrote i do not wish to give the impression that i think there is no mystery about consciousness there are a few researchers who believe that consciousness is an essential element in intelligence such as igor aleksander stan franklin ron sun and pentti haikonen although their definition of consciousness strays very close to intelligence see artificial consciousness before we can answer this question we must be clear what we mean by minds mental states and consciousness consciousness minds mental states meaning the words mind and consciousness are used by different communities in different ways some new age thinkers for example use the word consciousness to describe something similar to bergsons lan vital an invisible energetic fluid that permeates life and especially the mind science fiction writers use the word to describe some essential property that makes us human a machine or alien that is conscious will be presented as a fully human character with intelligence desires will insight pride and so on science fiction writers also use the words sentience sapience selfawareness or ghost as in the ghost in the shell manga and anime series to describe this essential human property for others the words mind or consciousness are used as a kind of secular synonym for the soul for philosophers neuroscientists and cognitive scientists the words are used in a way that is both more precise and more mundane they refer to the familiar everyday experience of having a thought in your head like a perception a dream an intention or a plan and to the way we know something or mean something or understand something what is mysterious and fascinating is not so much what it is but how it is how does a lump of fatty tissue and electricity give rise to this familiar experience of perceiving meaning or thinking philosophers call this the hard problem of consciousness it is the latest version of a classic problem in the philosophy of mind called the mindbody problem neurobiologists believe all these problems will be solved as we begin to identify the neural correlates of consciousness the actual relationship between the machinery in our heads and its collective properties such as the mind experience and understanding some of the harshest critics of artificial intelligence agree that the brain is just a machine and that consciousness and intelligence are the result of physical processes in the brain the difficult philosophical question is this can a computer program running on a digital machine that shuffles the binary digits of zero and one duplicate the ability of the neurons to create minds with mental states like understanding or perceiving and ultimately the experience of consciousness arguments that a computer cannot have a mind and mental states searles chinese room chinese room john searle asks us to consider a thought experiment suppose we have written a computer program that passes the turing test and demonstrates general intelligent action suppose specifically that the program can converse in fluent chinese write the program on 3x5 cards and give them to an ordinary person who does not speak chinese lock the person into a room and have him follow the instructions on the cards he will copy out chinese characters and pass them in and out of the room through a slot from the outside it will appear that the chinese room contains a fully intelligent person who speaks chinese the question is this is there anyone or anything in the room that understands chinese that is is there anything that has the mental state of understanding or which has conscious awareness of what is being discussed in chinese the man is clearly not aware the room cannot be aware the cards certainly arent aware searle concludes that the chinese room or any other physical symbol system cannot have a mind searle goes on to argue that actual mental states and consciousness require yet to be described actual physicalchemical properties of actual human brains related arguments leibniz mill daviss telephone exchange blocks chinese nation and blockhead gottfried leibniz made essentially the same argument as searle in 1714 using the thought experiment of expanding the brain until it was the size of a mill ned block also proposed his blockhead argument which is a version of the chinese room in which the program has been refactored into a simple set of rules of the form see this do that removing all mystery from the program responses to the chinese room responses to the chinese room emphasize several different points the systems reply and the virtual mind reply this reply argues that the system including the man the program the room and the cards is what understands chinese searle claims that the man in the room is the only thing which could possibly have a mind or understand but others disagree arguing that it is possible for there to be two minds in the same physical place similar to the way a computer can simultaneously be two machines at once one physical like a macintosh and one virtual like a word processor speed power and complexity replies several critics point out that the man in the room would probably take millions of years to respond to a simple question and would require filing cabinets of astronomical proportions this brings the clarity of searles intuition into doubt robot reply brain simulator reply what if the program simulates the sequence of nerve firings at the synapses of an actual brain of an actual chinese speaker the man in the room would be simulating an actual brain this is a variation on the systems reply that appears more plausible because the system now clearly operates like a human brain which strengthens the intuition that there is something besides the man in the room that could understand chinese other minds reply and the epiphenomena reply several people have noted that searles argument is just a version of the problem of other minds applied to machines since it is difficult to decide if people are actually thinking we should not be surprised that it is difficult to answer the same question about machines a related question is whether consciousness as searle understands it exists searle argues that the experience of consciousness cant be detected by examining the behavior of a machine a human being or any other animal daniel dennett points out that natural selection cannot preserve a feature of an animal that has no effect on the behavior of the animal and thus consciousness as searle understands it cant be produced by natural selection therefore either natural selection did not produce consciousness or strong ai is correct in that consciousness can be detected by suitably designed turing test is thinking a kind of computation computational theory of mind the computational theory of mind or computationalism claims that the relationship between mind and brain is similar if not identical to the relationship between a running program and a computer the idea has philosophical roots in hobbes who claimed reasoning was nothing more than reckoning leibniz who attempted to create a logical calculus of all human ideas hume who thought perception could be reduced to atomic impressions and even kant who analyzed all experience as controlled by formal rules this question bears on our earlier questions if the human brain is a kind of computer then computers can be both intelligent and conscious answering both the practical and philosophical questions of ai in terms of the practical question of ai can a machine display general intelligence some versions of computationalism make the claim that as hobbes wrote reasoning is nothing but reckoning in other words our intelligence derives from a form of calculation similar to arithmetic this is the physical symbol system hypothesis discussed above and it implies that artificial intelligence is possible in terms of the philosophical question of ai can a machine have mind mental states and consciousness most versions of computationalism claim that as stevan harnad characterizes it mental states are just implementations of the right computer programs this is john searles strong ai discussed above and it is the real target of the chinese room argument according to harnad other related questions alan turing noted that there are many arguments of the form a machine will never do x where x can be many things such as be kind resourceful beautiful friendly have initiative have a sense of humor tell right from wrong make mistakes fall in love enjoy strawberries and cream make someone fall in love with it learn from experience use words properly be the subject of its own thought have as much diversity of behaviour as a man do something really new turing argues that these objections are often based on naive assumptions about the versatility of machines or are disguised forms of the argument from consciousness writing a program that exhibits one of these behaviors will not make much of an impression all of these arguments are tangential to the basic premise of ai unless it can be shown that one of these traits is essential for general intelligence can a machine have emotions if emotions are defined only in terms of their effect on behavior or on how they function inside an organism then emotions can be viewed as a mechanism that an intelligent agent uses to maximize the utility of its actions given this definition of emotion hans moravec believes that robots in general will be quite emotional about being nice people however emotions can also be defined in terms of their subjective quality of what it feels like to have an emotion the question of whether the machine actually feels an emotion or whether it merely acts as if it is feeling an emotion is the philosophical question can a machine be conscious in another form can a machine be selfaware self awareness as noted above is sometimes used by science fiction writers as a name for the essential human property that makes a character fully human turing strips away all other properties of human beings and reduces the question to can a machine be the subject of its own thought can it think about itself viewed in this way a program can be written that can report on its own internal states such as a debugger though arguably selfawareness often presumes a bit more capability a machine that can ascribe meaning in some way to not only its own state but in general postulating questions without solid answers the contextual nature of its existence now how it compares to past states or plans for the future the limits and value of its work product how it perceives its performance to be valuedby or compared to others can a machine be original or creative turing reduces this to the question of whether a machine can take us by surprise and argues that this is obviously true as any programmer can attest it must be possible even trivial for a computer that can represent ideas to combine them in new ways douglas lenats automated mathematician as one example combined ideas to discover new mathematical truths in 2009 scientists at aberystwyth university in wales and the uks university of cambridge designed a robot called adam that they believe to be the first machine to independently come up with new scientific findings also in 2009 researchers at cornell developed eureqa a computer program that extrapolates formulas to fit the data inputted such as finding the laws of motion from a pendulums motion can a machine be benevolent or hostile ethics of artificial intelligence this question like many others in the philosophy of artificial intelligence can be presented in two forms hostility can be defined in terms function or behavior in which case hostile becomes synonymous with dangerous or it can be defined in terms of intent can a machine deliberately set out to do harm the latter is the question can a machine have conscious states such as intentions in another form the question of whether highly intelligent and completely autonomous machines would be dangerous has been examined in detail by futurists such as the singularity institute the obvious element of drama has also made the subject popular in science fiction which has considered many differently possible scenarios where intelligent machines pose a threat to mankind one issue is that machines may acquire the autonomy and intelligence required to be dangerous very quickly vernor vinge has suggested that over just a few years computers will suddenly become thousands or millions of times more intelligent than humans he calls this the singularity this is discussed by a philosophy called singularitarianism in 2009 academics and technical experts attended a conference to discuss the potential impact of robots and computers and the impact of the hypothetical possibility that they could become selfsufficient and able to make their own decisions they discussed the possibility and the extent to which computers and robots might be able to acquire any level of autonomy and to what degree they could use such abilities to possibly pose any threat or hazard they noted that some machines have acquired various forms of semiautonomy including being able to find power sources on their own and being able to independently choose targets to attack with weapons they also noted that some computer viruses can evade elimination and have achieved cockroach intelligence they noted that selfawareness as depicted in sciencefiction is probably unlikely but that there were other potential hazards and pitfalls some experts and academics have questioned the use of robots for military combat especially when such robots are given some degree of autonomous functions the president of the association for the advancement of artificial intelligence has commissioned a study to look at this issue they point to programs like the language acquisition device which can emulate human interaction some have suggested a need to build friendly ai meaning that the advances which are already occurring with ai should also include an effort to make ai intrinsically friendly and humane can a machine have a soul finally those who believe in the existence of a soul may argue that thinking is a function of mans immortal soul alan turing called this the theological objection he writes in attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping his power of creating souls any more than we are in the procreation of children rather we are in either case instruments of his will providing mansions for the souls that he creates views on the role of philosophy some scholars argue that the ai communitys dismissal of philosophy is detrimental in the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy some philosophers argue that the role of philosophy in ai is underappreciated bibliography conferences the main bibliography on the subject with several subsections is on philpapers the main conference series on the issue is philosophy and theory of ai ptai run by vincent c mller philosophy portal psychology portal spirituality portal ethics portal science portal artificial intelligence portal mind and brain portal ai takeover artificial brain artificial consciousness artificial intelligence brain other matters section chatterbot chinese room computational theory of mind computing machinery and intelligence dreyfus critique of artificial intelligence existential risk from advanced artificial intelligence functionalism multiagent system philosophy of computer science philosophy of information philosophy of mind physical symbol system simulated reality superintelligence paths dangers strategies synthetic intelligence notes blackmore susan 2005 consciousness a very short introduction oxford university press bostrom nick 2014 superintelligence paths dangers strategies oxford university press isbn9780199678112 brooks rodney 1990 elephants dont play chess pdf robotics and autonomous systems 6 315 doi101016s0921889005800259 retrieved 20070830 chalmers david j 1996 the conscious mind in search of a fundamental theory oxford university press new york isbn0195117891 cole david fall 2004 the chinese room argument in zalta edward n the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy crevier daniel 1993 ai the tumultuous search for artificial intelligence new york ny basicbooks isbn0465029973 dennett daniel 1991 consciousness explained the penguin press isbn0713990376 dreyfus hubert 1972 what computers cant do new york mit press isbn0060110821 dreyfus hubert 1979 what computers still cant do new york mit press dreyfus hubert dreyfus stuart 1986 mind over machine the power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer oxford uk blackwell fearn nicholas 2007 the latest answers to the oldest questions a philosophical adventure with the worlds greatest thinkers new york grove press gladwell malcolm 2005 blink the power of thinking without thinking boston little brown isbn0316172324 harnad stevan 2001 whats wrong and right about searles chinese room argument in bishop m preston j essays on searles chinese room argument oxford university press haugeland john 1985 artificial intelligence the very idea cambridge mass mit press hobbes 1651 leviathan hofstadter douglas 1979 gdel escher bach an eternal golden braid horst steven 2009 the computational theory of mind in zalta edward n the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy kurzweil ray 2005 the singularity is near new york viking press isbn0670033847 lucas john 1961 minds machines and gdel in anderson ar minds and machines mccarthy john minsky marvin rochester nathan shannon claude 1955 a proposal for the dartmouth summer research project on artificial intelligence archived from the original on 20080930 mcdermott drew may 14 1997 how intelligent is deep blue new york times moravec hans 1988 mind children harvard university press newell allen simon h a 1963 gps a program that simulates human thought in feigenbaum ea feldman j computers and thought new york mcgrawhill newell allen simon h a 1976 computer science as empirical inquiry symbols and search communications of the acm 19 3 archived from the original on 20081007 russell stuart j norvig peter 2003 artificial intelligence a modern approach 2nd ed upper saddle river new jersey prentice hall isbn0137903952 penrose roger 1989 the emperors new mind concerning computers minds and the laws of physics oxford university press isbn0140145346 searle john 1980 minds brains and programs pdf behavioral and brain sciences 3 3 417457 doi101017s0140525x00005756 archived from the original pdf on 20150923 searle john 1992 the rediscovery of the mind cambridge massachusetts mit press searle john 1999 mind language and society new york ny basic books isbn0465045219 oclc231867665 turing alan october 1950 computing machinery and intelligence mind lix 236 433460 doi101093mindlix236433 issn00264423 yee richard 1993 turing machines and semantic symbol processing why real computers dont mind chinese emperors pdf lyceum 5 1 3759 page numbers above and diagram contents refer to the lyceum pdf print of the article vtephilosophy of mindtheories behaviorism radical biological naturalism cognitive psychology mindbody dualism eliminative materialism emergent materialism emergentism epiphenomenalism functionalism idealism interactionism materialism monism nave realism neurophenomenology neutral monism occasionalism psychoanalysis parallelism phenomenalism phenomenology physicalism identity theory property dualism representational solipsism substance dualism concepts abstract object artificial intelligence chinese room cognition cognitive closure concept concept and object consciousness hard problem of consciousness hypostatic abstraction idea identity ingenuity intelligence intentionality introspection intuition language of thought materialism mental event mental image mental process mental property mental representation mind mindbody problem nonphysical entity new mysterianism pain privileged access problem of other minds propositional attitude qualia tabula rasa understanding zombie more related topics metaphysics philosophy of artificial intelligence information perception self portal category philosophers category project task force vtephilosophy of scienceconcepts analysis analyticsynthetic distinction a priori and a posteriori causality commensurability consilience construct creative synthesis demarcation problem empirical evidence explanatory power fact falsifiability feminist method ignoramus et ignorabimus inductive reasoning intertheoretic reduction inquiry nature objectivity observation paradigm problem of induction scientific law scientific method scientific revolution scientific theory testability theory choice theoryladenness underdetermination unity of science metatheoryof science coherentism confirmation holism constructive empiricism constructive realism constructivist epistemology contextualism conventionalism deductivenomological model hypotheticodeductive model inductionism epistemological anarchism evolutionism fallibilism foundationalism instrumentalism pragmatism modeldependent realism naturalism physicalism positivism reductionism determinism rationalism empiricism received view semantic view of theories scientific realism antirealism scientific essentialism scientific formalism scientific skepticism scientism structuralism uniformitarianism vitalism philosophy of physics thermal and statistical motion chemistry biology environment geography social science technology engineering artificial intelligence computer science information mind psychiatry psychology perception space and time related topics alchemy criticism of science epistemology faith and rationality history and philosophy of science history of science history of evolutionary thought logic metaphysics pseudoscience relationship between religion and science rhetoric of science sociology of scientific knowledge sociology of scientific ignorance philosophers of science by eraancient plato aristotle stoicism epicureans medieval averroes avicenna roger bacon william of ockham hugh of saint victor dominicus gundissalinus robert kilwardby early modern francis bacon thomas hobbes ren descartes galileo galilei pierre gassendi isaac newton david hume late modern immanuel kant friedrich schelling william whewell auguste comte john stuart mill herbert spencer wilhelm wundt charles sanders peirce wilhelm windelband henri poincar pierre duhem rudolf steiner karl pearson contemporary alfred north whitehead bertrand russell albert einstein otto neurath c d broad michael polanyi hans reichenbach rudolf carnap karl popper carl gustav hempel w v o quine thomas kuhn imre lakatos paul feyerabend jrgen habermas ian hacking bas van fraassen larry laudan daniel dennett portal category vtepsychology history philosophy portal psychologist basic psychology abnormal affective science affective neuroscience behavioral genetics behavioral neuroscience behaviorism cognitivecognitivism cognitive neuroscience comparative crosscultural cultural developmental differential ecological evolutionary experimental gestalt intelligence mathematical neuropsychology perception personality positive psycholinguistics psychophysiology quantitative social theoretical applied psychology anomalistic applied behavior analysis assessment clinical community consumer counseling critical educational ergonomics feminist forensic health industrial and organizational legal media military music occupational health pastoral political psychometrics psychotherapy religion school sport and exercise suicidology systems traffic methodologies animal testing archival research behavior epigenetics case study content analysis experiments human subject research interviews neuroimaging observation psychophysics qualitative research quantitative research selfreport inventory statistical surveys psychologists wilhelm wundt18321920 william james18421910 ivan pavlov18491936 sigmund freud18561939 edward thorndike18741949 carl jung18751961 john b watson18781958 clark l hull18841952 kurt lewin18901947 jean piaget18961980 gordon allport18971967 j p guilford18971987 carl rogers19021987 erik erikson19021994 b f skinner19041990 donald o hebb19041985 ernest hilgard19042001 harry harlow19051981 raymond cattell19051998 abraham maslow19081970 neal e miller19092002 jerome bruner19152016 donald t campbell19161996 hans eysenck19161997 herbert a simon19162001 david mcclelland19171998 leon festinger19191989 george armitage miller19202012 richard lazarus19222002 stanley schachter19221997 robert zajonc19232008 albert bandurab1925 roger brown19251997 endel tulvingb1927 lawrence kohlberg19271987 noam chomskyb1928 ulric neisser19282012 jerome kaganb1929 walter mischel19302018 elliot aronsonb1932 daniel kahnemanb1934 paul ekmanb1934 michael posnerb1936 amos tversky19371996 bruce mcewenb1938 larry squireb1941 richard e nisbettb1941 martin seligmanb1942 ed dienerb1946 shelley e taylorb1946 john andersonb1947 ronald c kesslerb1947 joseph e ledouxb1949 richard davidsonb1951 susan fiskeb1952 roy baumeisterb1953 lists counseling topics disciplines important publications organizations outline psychologists psychotherapies research methods schools of thought timeline topics wiktionary definition wiktionary category wikisource wikimedia commons wikiquote wikinews wikibooks vtephilosophybranchestraditional metaphysics ontology epistemology logic ethics aesthetics philosophy of action art culture design music film business color cosmos dialogue education environment futility happiness healthcare history human nature humor feminism language life literature mathematics mind pain psychology philosophy of psychiatry philosophy of perception philosophy religion science physics chemistry biology geography sexuality social science culture economics justice law politics society space and time sport technology artificial intelligence computer science engineering information war schools of thoughtby era ancient western medieval renaissance early modern modern contemporary ancientchinese agriculturalism confucianism legalism logicians mohism chinese naturalism neotaoism taoism yangism zen grecoroman aristotelianism atomism cynicism cyrenaics eleatics eretrian school epicureanism hermeneutics ionian ephesian milesian megarian school neoplatonism peripatetic platonism pluralism presocratic pyrrhonism pythagoreanism neopythagoreanism sophistic stoicism indian samkhya nyaya vaisheshika yoga mms jvika ajana crvka jain anekantavada sydvda buddhist nyat madhyamaka yogacara sautrntika svatantrika persian mazdakism zoroastrianism zurvanism medievaleuropean christian philosophy scholasticism thomism renaissance humanism east asian korean confucianism edo neoconfucianism neoconfucianism indian vedanta acintya bheda abheda advaita bhedabheda dvaita dvaitadvaita shuddhadvaita vishishtadvaita navyanyya islamic averroism avicennism illuminationism ilm alkalm sufi jewish judeoislamic modernpeople cartesianism kantianism neokantianism hegelianism marxism spinozism 0 anarchism classical realism liberalism collectivism conservatism determinism dualism empiricism existentialism foundationalism historicism holism humanism anti idealism absolute british german objective subjective transcendental individualism kokugaku materialism modernism monism naturalism natural law nihilism new confucianism neoscholasticism pragmatism phenomenology positivism reductionism rationalism social contract socialism transcendentalism utilitarianism contemporaryanalytic applied ethics analytic feminism analytical marxism communitarianism consequentialism critical rationalism experimental philosophy falsificationism foundationalism coherentism generative linguistics internalism and externalism logical positivism legal positivism normative ethics metaethics moral realism neoaristotelian quinean naturalism ordinary language philosophy postanalytic philosophy quietism rawlsian reformed epistemology systemics scientism scientific realism scientific skepticism contemporary utilitarianism vienna circle wittgensteinian continental critical theory deconstruction existentialism feminist frankfurt school new historicism hermeneutics neomarxism phenomenology posthumanism postmodernism poststructuralism social constructionism structuralism western marxism other kyoto school objectivism russian cosmism more positionsaesthetics formalism institutionalism aesthetic response ethics consequentialism deontology virtue free will compatibilism determinism hard incompatibilism hard libertarianism metaphysics atomism dualism monism naturalism epistemology constructivism empiricism idealism particularism fideism rationalism reasonism skepticism solipsism mind behaviorism emergentism eliminativism epiphenomenalism functionalism objectivism subjectivism normativity absolutism particularism relativism nihilism skepticism universalism ontology action event process reality antirealism conceptualism idealism materialism naturalism nominalism physicalism realism philosophy by regionphilosophyrelated listsmiscellaneousby region african ethiopian aztec native america eastern chinese egyptian czech indian indonesian iranian japanese korean vietnam pakistani western american australian british danish french german greek italian polish romanian russian slovene spanish turkish lists outline index years problems schools glossary philosophers movements publications miscellaneous women in philosophy sage philosophy portal category book 