electronic voting part of the politics series voting absentee ballot abstention ballot ballot box ballot stuffing caging coattail effect compulsory voting donkey vote early voting election boycott election ink electorate electoral fraud electronic voting instantrunoff voting issue voting likely voter none of the above open ballot system open list paradox of voting passive electioneering polling place popular vote postal voting precinct protest vote provisional ballot refused ballot secret ballot spoilt vote slate splitticket voting straightticket voting tactical voting tally ticket vote center vote counting vote pairing voter apathy voter fatigue voter registration voter suppression voter turnout voting booth voting system voting machine writein candidate politics portalvte electronic voting also known as evoting refers to voting using electronic means to either aid or take care of the chores of casting and counting votes depending on the particular implementation evoting may use standalone electronic voting machines also called evm or computers connected to the internet it may encompass a range of internet services from basic transmission of tabulated results to fullfunction online voting through common connectable household devices the degree of automation may be limited to marking a paper ballot or may be a comprehensive system of vote input vote recording data encryption and transmission to servers and consolidation and tabulation of election results a worthy evoting system must perform most of these tasks while complying with a set of standards established by regulatory bodies and must also be capable to deal successfully with strong requirements associated with security accuracy integrity swiftness privacy auditability accessibility costeffectiveness scalability and ecological sustainability electronic voting technology can include punched cards optical scan voting systems and specialized voting kiosks including selfcontained directrecording electronic voting systems or dre it can also involve transmission of ballots and votes via telephones private computer networks or the internet in general two main types of evoting can be identified evoting which is physically supervised by representatives of governmental or independent electoral authorities eg electronic voting machines located at polling stations remote evoting via the internet also called ivoting where the voter submits their votes electronically to the election authorities from any location benefits electronic voting technology intends to speed the counting of ballots reduce the cost of paying staff to count votes manually and can provide improved accessibility for disabled voters concerns it has been demonstrated that as voting systems become more complex and include software different methods of election fraud become possible others also challenge the use of electronic voting from a theoretical point of view arguing that humans are not equipped for verifying operations occurring within an electronic machine and that because people cannot verify these operations the operations cannot be trusted critics of electronic voting including security analyst bruce schneier note that computer security experts are unanimous on what to do some voting experts disagree but it is the computer security experts who need to be listened to the problems here are with the computer not with the fact that the computer is being used in a voting application dre machines must have a voterverifiable paper audit trails software used on dre machines must be open to public scrutiny to ensure the accuracy of the voting system verifiable ballots are necessary because computers can and do malfunction and because voting machines can be compromised many insecurities have been found in commercial voting machines such as using a default administration password there has been contention especially in the united states that electronic voting especially dre voting could facilitate electoral fraud and may not be fully auditable in addition electronic voting has been criticised as unnecessary and expensive to introduce while countries like india continue to use electronic voting several countries have cancelled evoting systems or decided against a largescale rollout notably the netherlands ireland germany and the united kingdom due to issues in reliability of evms types of system electronic voting systems for electorates have been in use since the 1960s internet voting systems have gained popularity and have been used for government elections and referendums in estonia and switzerland there are also hybrid systems that include an electronic ballot marking device usually a touch screen system similar to a dre or other assistive technology to print a voter verified paper audit trail then use a separate machine for electronic tabulation paperbased electronic voting system a cart holding an ess m100 ballot scanner and an automark assistive device as used in johnson county iowa united states in 2010 sometimes called a document ballot voting system paperbased voting systems originated as a system where votes are cast and counted by hand using paper ballots with the advent of electronic tabulation came systems where paper cards or sheets could be marked by hand but counted electronically these systems included punched card voting marksense and later digital pen voting systems these systems can include a ballot marking device or electronic ballot marker that allows voters to make their selections using an electronic input device usually a touch screen system similar to a dre systems including a ballot marking device can incorporate different forms of assistive technology in 2004 open voting consortium demonstrated the dechert design a general public license open source paper ballot printing system with open source bar codes on each ballot directrecording electronic dre voting system dre voting machine electronic voting machine by premier election solutions formerly diebold election systems used in all brazilian elections and plebiscites photo by agncia brasil a directrecording electronic dre voting machine records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electrooptical components that can be activated by the voter typically buttons or a touchscreen that processes data with computer software and that records voting data and ballot images in memory components after the election it produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as a printed copy the system may also provide a means for transmitting individual ballots or vote totals to a central location for consolidating and reporting results from precincts at the central location these systems use a precinct count method that tabulates ballots at the polling place they typically tabulate ballots as they are cast and print the results after the close of polling in 2002 in the united states the help america vote act mandated that one handicapped accessible voting system be provided per polling place which most jurisdictions have chosen to satisfy with the use of dre voting machines some switching entirely over to dre in 2004 289 of the registered voters in the united states used some type of direct recording electronic voting system electronic voting machine evm used in india in 2004 india adopted electronic voting machines evm for its elections to its parliament with 380 million voters casting their ballots using more than one million voting machines public network dre voting system a public network dre voting system is an election system that uses electronic ballots and transmits vote data from the polling place to another location over a public network vote data may be transmitted as individual ballots as they are cast periodically as batches of ballots throughout the election day or as one batch at the close of voting this includes internet voting as well as telephone voting public network dre voting system can utilize either precinct count or central count method the central count method tabulates ballots from multiple precincts at a central location internet voting can use remote locations voting from any internet capable computer or can use traditional polling locations with voting booths consisting of internet connected voting systems corporations and organizations routinely use internet voting to elect officers and board members and for other proxy elections internet voting systems have been used privately in many modern nations and publicly in the united states the uk switzerland and estonia in switzerland where it is already an established part of local referendums voters get their passwords to access the ballot through the postal service most voters in estonia can cast their vote in local and parliamentary elections if they want to via the internet as most of those on the electoral roll have access to an evoting system the largest run by any european union country it has been made possible because most estonians carry a national identity card equipped with a computerreadable microchip and it is these cards which they use to get access to the online ballot all a voter needs is a computer an electronic card reader their id card and its pin and they can vote from anywhere in the world estonian evotes can only be cast during the days of advance voting on election day itself people have to go to polling stations and fill in a paper ballot online voting not to be confused with open access poll in march 2000 the arizona democratic party ran its presidential primary over the internet using the private company votationcom by 2009 estonia had advanced the farthest in utilizing internet voting technology impact on turnout a 2017 study of online voting in two swiss cantons found that it had no effect on turnout a paper on remote electronic voting and turnout in the estonian 2007 parliamentary elections showed that rather than eliminating inequalities evoting might have enhanced the digital divide between higher and lower socioeconomic classes people who lived greater distances from polling areas voted at higher levels with this service now available the 2007 estonian elections yielded a higher voter turnout from those who lived in higher income regions and who received formal education impact on election outcomes the use of electronic voting in elections remains a contentious issue some countries such as netherlands and germany have stopped using it after it was shown to be unreliable while the indian election commission recommends it the involvement of numerous stakeholders including companies that manufacture these machines as well as political parties that stand to gain from rigging complicates this further a 2017 study of brazil found no systematic difference in vote choices between online and offline electorates however it has been also argued that the rigging of evms influenced the results of elections in india in 2017 to a large extent it has further been argued political parties that have more support from the less fortunatewho are unfamiliar with the internetmay suffer in the elections due to evoting which tends to increase voting in the uppermiddle class it is unsure as to whether narrowing the digital divide would promote equal voting opportunities for people across various social economic and ethnic backgrounds in the long run this is contingent not only on internet accessibility which is already widely available in estonia but also depends on peoples level of familiarity with the internet the security of these in person electronic voting machines is almost entirely dependent on the implementation of security protocols at each locality a group of researchers studying the recent estonian elections describe massive operational lapses in security from transferring election results on personal thumb drives to posting network credentials on the wall in view of the public the researchers concluded that these systems are insecure in their current implementation and due to the rise of nation state interest in influencing elections should be discontinue analysis isg topvoter a machine designed specifically to be used by voters with disabilities electronic voting systems may offer advantages compared to other voting techniques an electronic voting system can be involved in any one of a number of steps in the setup distributing voting collecting and counting of ballots and thus may or may not introduce advantages into any of these steps potential disadvantages exist as well including the potential for flaws or weakness in any electronic component charles stewart of the massachusetts institute of technology estimates that 1 million more ballots were counted in the 2004 usa presidential election than in 2000 because electronic voting machines detected votes that paperbased machines would have missed in may 2004 the us government accountability office released a report titled electronic voting offers opportunities and presents challenges electronic ballots electronic voting systems may use electronic ballot to store votes in computer memory systems which use them exclusively are called dre voting systems when electronic ballots are used there is no risk of exhausting the supply of ballots additionally these electronic ballots remove the need for printing of paper ballots a significant cost the situation with lever machines would be even worse than with paper the only apparent way to reliably meet the need would be to set up a chineselanguage lever machine at each polling place few of which would be used at all critics argue accessibility a hart eslate dre voting machine with jelly buttons for people with manual dexterity disabilities electronic voting machines can be made fully accessible for persons with disabilities punched card and optical scan machines are not fully accessible for the blind or visually impaired and lever machines can be difficult for voters with limited mobility and strength electronic machines can use headphones sip and puff foot pedals joy sticks and other adaptive technology to provide the necessary accessibility organizations such as the verified voting foundation have criticized the accessibility of electronic voting machines however other disabled voters including voters with dexterity disabilities could be unable to use these ballots cryptographic verification the concept of election verifiability through cryptographic solutions has emerged in the academic literature to introduce transparency and trust in electronic voting systems individual universal and eligibility individual verifiability allows a voter to check that her own vote is included in the election outcome universal verifiability allows voters or election observers to check that the election outcome corresponds to the votes cast and eligibility verifiability allows voters and observers to check that each vote in the election outcome was cast by a uniquely registered voter voter intent electronic voting machines are able to provide immediate feedback to the voter detecting such possible problems as undervoting and overvoting which may result in a spoiled ballot this immediate feedback can be helpful in successfully determining voter intent transparency it has been alleged by groups such as the ukbased open rights group that a lack of testing inadequate audit procedures and insufficient attention given to system or process design with electronic voting leaves elections open to error and fraud in 2009 the federal constitutional court of germany found that when using voting machines the verification of the result must be possible by the citizen reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject the dre nedapcomputers used till then did not fulfill that requirement the decision did not ban electronic voting as such but requires all essential steps in elections to be subject to public examinability in 2013 the california association of voting officials was formed to maintain efforts toward publicly owned general public license open source voting systems coercion evidence in 2013 researchers from europe proposed that the electronic voting systems should be coercion evident audit trails further information voter verified paper audit trail and endtoend auditable voting systems a fundamental challenge with any voting machine is produce evidence that the votes were recorded as cast and tabulated as recorded election results produced by voting systems that rely on votermarked paper ballots can be verified with manual hand counts either valid sampling or full recounts nondocument ballot voting systems must support auditability in different ways an independently auditable system sometimes called an independent verification can be used in recounts or audits these systems can include the ability for voters to verify how their votes were cast or enable officials to verify that votes were tabulated correctly a discussion draft argued by researchers at the national institute of standards and technology nist states simply put the dre architectures inability to provide for independent audits of its electronic records makes it a poor choice for an environment in which detecting errors and fraud is important a diebold election systems inc model accuvotetsx dre voting machine with vvpat attachment various technologies can be used to assure dre voters that their votes were cast correctly and allow officials to detect possible fraud or malfunction and to provide a means to audit the tabulated results some systems include technologies such as cryptography visual or mathematical paper kept by the voter or verified and left with election officials audio verification and dual recording or witness systems other than with paper dr rebecca mercuri the creator of the voter verified paper audit trail vvpat concept as described in her phd dissertation in october 2000 on the basic voter verifiable ballot system proposes to answer the auditability question by having the voting machine print a paper ballot or other paper facsimile that can be visually verified by the voter before being entered into a secure location subsequently this is sometimes referred to as the mercuri method to be truly voterverified the record itself must be verified by the voter and able to be done without assistance such as visually or audibly if the voter must use a barcode scanner or other electronic device to verify then the record is not truly voterverifiable since it is actually the electronic device that is verifying the record for the voter vvpat is the form of independent verification most commonly found in elections in the united states and other countries such as venezuela endtoend auditable voting systems can provide the voter with a receipt that can be taken home this receipt does not allow voters to prove to others how they voted but it does allow them to verify that the system detected their vote correctly endtoend e2e systems include punchscan threeballot and prt voter scantegrity is an addon that extends current optical scan voting systems with an e2e layer the city of takoma park maryland used scantegrity ii for its november 2009 election systems that allow the voter to prove how they voted are never used in us public elections and are outlawed by most state constitutions the primary concerns with this solution are voter intimidation and vote selling an audit system can be used in measured random recounts to detect possible malfunction or fraud with the vvpat method the paper ballot is often treated as the official ballot of record in this scenario the ballot is primary and the electronic records are used only for an initial count in any subsequent recounts or challenges the paper not the electronic ballot would be used for tabulation whenever a paper record serves as the legal ballot that system will be subject to the same benefits and concerns as any paper ballot system to successfully audit any voting machine a strict chain of custody is required the solution was first demonstrated new york city march 2001 and used sacramento california 2002 by avante international technology inc in 2004 nevada was the first state to successfully implement a dre voting system that printed an electronic record the 93 million voting system provided by sequoia voting systems included more than 2600 avc edge touchscreen dres equipped with the verivote vvpat component hardware inadequately secured hardware can be subject to physical tampering some critics such as the group wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet we do not trust voting machines charge that for instance foreign hardware could be inserted into the machine or between the user and the central mechanism of the machine itself using a man in the middle attack technique and thus even sealing dre machines may not be sufficient protection software security experts such as bruce schneier have demanded that voting machine source code should be publicly available for inspection testing and certification see also certification of voting machines one method to any error with voting machines is parallel testing which are conducted on the election day with randomly picked machines the acm published a study showing that to change the outcome of the 2000 us presidential election only 2 votes in each precinct would have needed to be changed other criticisms can be mitigated by review and testing procedures to detect fraudulent code or hardware if such things are present and through a verifiable chain of custody to prevent the insertion of such hardware or software critics also mention the increasing number of attack programs that online voting systems are greatly susceptible to malicious payloads software data intended to do damage have become so advanced that they can easily change a voters vote without any knowledge to other parties regardless of voter identification or encryption software benefits can include reduced tabulation times and an increase of participation voter turnout particularly through the use of internet voting those in opposition suggest alternate vote counting systems citing switzerland as well as many other countries which uses paper ballots exclusively suggesting that electronic voting is not the only means to get a rapid count of votes a country of a little over 7 million people switzerland publishes a definitive ballot count in about six hours in villages the ballots are even counted manually critics also note that it becomes difficult or impossible to verify the identity of a voter remotely and that the introduction of public networks become more vulnerable and complex whether the total cost of ownership with electronic voting is lower than other systems is not yet by country electronic voting by country polling place electronic voting or internet voting examples have taken place in australia brazil in 1996 after tests conducted on more than 50 municipalities the brazilian electoral justice has launched their voting machine since 2000 all brazilian voters are able to use the electronic ballot boxes to choose their candidates in 2010 presidential election which had more than 135 million voters the result was defined 75 minutes after the end of voting the electronic ballot box is made up of two microterminals one located in the voting cabin and the other with the voting board representative which are connected by a 5meter cable externally the microterminals have only a numerical keyboard which does not accept any command executed by the simultaneous pressure of more than one key in case of power failure the internal battery provides the energy or it can be connected to an automotive battery the brazilian electronic ballot box serves today as a model for other countries estonia each estonian citizen possesses an electronic chipenabled id card which allows himher to vote over the internet the id card is inserted into a card reader which is connected to a computer once hisher identity is verified using the electronic id card as a sort of digital signature heshe can then cast hisher vote via the internet votes are not considered final until the end of election day so estonian citizens can go back and recast their votes until election day is officially over popularity of online voting in estonia has increased widely throughout the nation as in the elections of 2014 and 2015 nearly one third of estonian votes were cast online india electronic voting machines evm are being used in indian general and state elections to implement electronic voting in part from 1999 elections and recently in 2017 state elections held in five states across india evms have replaced paper ballots in local state and general parliamentary elections in india there were earlier claims regarding evms tamparability and security which have not been provedafter rulings of delhi high court supreme court and demands from various political partieselection commission decided to introduce evms with voterverified paper audit trail vvpat system the vvpat system was introduced in 8 of 543 parliamentary constituencies as a pilot project in indian general election 2014 united states it has been suggested that this section be merged with electronic voting by countryunited states of america discuss proposed since december 2017 timeline of development 1964 the nordencoleman optical scan voting system the first such system to see actual use was adopted for use in orange county california 1974 the video voter the first dre voting machine used in a government election developed by the frank thornber company in chicago illinois saw its first trial use in 1974 near chicago mar 1975 the us government is given a report by roy saltman a consultant in developing election technology and policies in which the certification of voting machines is analyzed for the first time aug 28 1986 the uniformed and overseas citizen absentee voting act of 1986 uocava requires that us states allow certain groups of citizens to register and vote absentee in elections for federal offices 1990 the fec federal election commission released a universalized standard for computerized voting 1996 the reform party uses ivoting internet voting to select their presidential candidate this election is the first governmental election to use this method in the us may 2002 the fec revised the standards established for electronic voting from 1990 nov 2004 4438 of votes in the general election is lost by north carolinas electronic voting machines the machines continued to count electronic votes past the devices memory capacity and the votes were irretrievably lost dec 2005 black box voting showed how easy it is to hack an electronic voting system computer experts in leon county fl lead a simulation where they changed the outcome of a mock election by tampering with the tabulator without leaving evidence of their actions sep 13 2006 it was demonstrated that diebold electronic voting machine can be hacked in less than a minute princetons professor of computer science edward felten who installed a malware which could steal votes and replace them with fraudulent numbers without physically coming in contact with the voting machine or its memory card the malware can also program a virus that can spread from machine to machine sep 21 2006 the governor of maryland bob ehrlich r advised against casting electronic votes as an alternative method for casting paper absentee ballots this was a complete turn around since maryland became one of the first states to accept electronic voting systems statewide during his term sep 3 2009 diebold responsible for much of the technology in the electionsystems business sells their hold to election systems software inc for 5 million less than 15 of its price seven years earlier oct 28 2009 the federal military and overseas voters empowerment act move requires us states to provide ballots to uocava voters in at least one electronic format email fax or an online delivery system jan 3 2013 voter empowerment act of 2013 this act requires each us state to make available public websites for online voter registration astronauts in orbit texas law has allowed american astronauts who cannot vote in person and are unable to vote via absentee ballot such as those aboard the international space station and mir space station to cast their ballots in federal elections electronically from orbit since 1997 ballots are sent via secure email to the johnson spaceflight center and then passed on to the astronauts home counties in texas recommendations for improvement in december 2005 the us election assistance commission unanimously adopted the 2005 voluntary voting system guidelines which significantly increase security requirements for voting systems and expand access including opportunities to vote privately and independently for individuals with disabilities the guidelines took effect in december 2007 replacing the 2002 voting system standards vss developed by the federal election commission some groups such as the open voting consortium believe that to restore voter confidence and to reduce the potential for fraud all electronic voting systems must be completely available to public scrutiny also proposed is the requirement for use of open public standards and specifications such as the election markup language eml standard developed by oasis and now under consideration by iso see documents and schemas these can provide consistent processes and mechanisms for managing and performing elections using computer systems legislation in the summer of 2004 the legislative affairs committee of the association of information technology professionals issued a ninepoint proposal for national standards for electronic voting legislation has been introduced in the united states congress regarding electronic voting including the nelsonwhitehouse bill this bill would appropriate as much as 1 billion dollars to fund states replacement of touch screen systems with optical scan voting system the legislation also addresses requiring audits of 3 of precincts in all federal elections it also mandates some form of paper trail audits for all electronic voting machines by the year 2012 on any type of voting technology another bill hr811 the voter confidence and increased accessibility act of 2003 proposed by representative rush d holt jr a democrat from new jersey would act as an amendment to the help america vote act of 2002 and require electronic voting machines to produce a paper audit trail for every vote during 2008 congressman holt because of an increasing concern regarding the insecurities surrounding the use of electronic voting technology submitted additional bills to congress regarding the future of electronic voting one called the emergency assistance for secure elections act of 2008 hr5036 states that the general services administration will reimburse states for the extra costs of providing paper ballots to citizens and the costs needed to hire people to count them a voting date has not yet been determined the secure americas future elections act or the safe act hr 1562 was among the relevant legislation introduced in the 115th congress the bills provisions include designation of the infrastructure used to administer elections as critical infrastructure funding for states to upgrade the security of the information technology and cybersecurity elements of electionrelated it systems and requirements for durable readable paper ballots and manual audits of results of elections south africa thanks to the internet voters can cast their ballots over the electronic voting systems conveniently and efficiently without going to the polling stations evoting is a new technology has been implemented by developed countries most of the research has embraced this technology within this context therefore there is a necessity to explore the implementation and adoption of this technology in developing countries such as south africa although the evoting system has not yet been implemented in south africa researchers such as myself are attempted to study evoting deployment opportunities in south africa in the report on evoting in the seminar that was held in cape town south africa date 12 and 12th march 2013 south africas former president kgalema motlanthe challenged the countrys iec independent electoral commission to explore the possibility of evoting due to the aftermath of the 2009 national and provincial elections where the country saw an increase in the number of voting stations from 14 650 in 1999 to 19 726 hence south africa is now looking to move into electronic voting systems since there is also evidence that evoting reduces the costs of elections paper printing and workforce costs as these have been developed and are developing for decades with the aim of allowing an easier participation of the citizens in the decisionmaking process but without the physical and human resources needed in a traditional voting countries like mexico turkey and nigeria who did surveys on the voters perception of security and other trust factors got an overall result that automated elections mean that people can trust the results because it allows for a process that is auditable transparent and secure since it helps reduce human error where for other largely populated countries like brazil india and the philippines electronic voting and electronic counting means that people can get official election results within hours instead of weeks alomari and figueroa in a nut shell the main feature of democracy is the right or chance to vote express an opinion andor participate in a decision voting which gives freedom to choose the best leader for the country said osho et al 2015 this alone gives opportunity to the people to choose a leader and express their point of view this proposal is to ensure that this expectation is met with the deployment of evoting system not only is evoting great with the turnaroundtime on producing results but it also provides a greater auditable auditing process of the election results where necessary as stated by sedky hamed that sometimes electronic have and will produce errors in the elections result due to problems with hardware andor software or procedures auditing has such benefits in revealing when recounts are necessary to verify election outcomes finding errors whether accidental or intentional deterring fraud and promoting public confidence in elections main objectives to be considered when thinking evoting in south africa to determine factors needed for the deployment of evoting in south africa to identify the measures taken when deploying evoting in south africa to analyze the influence of the identified factors needed to deploy evoting in south africa nigeria professor osho did a research which intended to address the concerns about data security verifiability and certification and cost the basic factors to be considered when deploying evoting he created a conceptual framework which combined 3 theories to build 1 conceptual framework through the 5 constructs in assisting to arrive to the aiming of this research thus the research papers identified that there is a need to understand the security and cost concerns the 3 theoretical frameworks being used in this research paper to create 1 conceptual framework will help complete this study namely they are process visualization theory for processes that have relied on physical interaction between people and between people and objects are being migrated to virtual environments in which physical interaction is not available and the constructs needed for it are representation and monitoring capacity to produce a synchronism requirements in the process portfolio theory the it projects portfolios are formed according to the organizations strategic objectives the risks project costs the impact on the companys success factors and resource use and the construct needed for it the cost construct contingency theory uses it publication of information can be controlled and relevant information can be shared with relevant access controlled parties this technique uses role based security system which allows all the benefits of it while still maintaining confidentiality and the constructs needed for it are data management and security documented problems with electronic voting australia ivote is a remote electronic voting system in new south wales that allows eligible voters a chance to vote over the internet however during the new south wales state election in 2015 there were several reports that over 66000 electronic votes could have been compromised although the ivote website is secure security specialist believe that a third party website was able to attack the system this was the first time a major vulnerability was discovered in the middle of an ongoing poll canada the new democratic party leadership election 2012 was conducted partially online with party members who were not in attendance at the convention hall able to cast their leadership vote online however for part of the day the online voting server was affected by a denialofservice attack delaying the completion and tabulation of results in the 2018 ontario municipal elections over 150 municipalities in the canadian province of ontario conducted their elections primarily online with physical polling stations either abandoned entirely or limited to only a few central polling stations for voters who could not or did not want to vote online india in april 2017 eighteen evm machines in dholpur rajasthan were found to be registering votes for the wrong person votes being given to one party were wrongly being registered for another political party bjp instead in the april 2017 elections in bhind madhya pradesh electronic machines were found rigged thus registering votes to the bharatiya janta party bjp even when the voter voted for other parties 18 officials were suspended due to this however the results were not declared incorrect omesh saigal an iit alumnus and ias officer demonstrated that the 2009 elections in india when congress party of india came back to power might be rigged this forced the election commission to review the current evms finland in finland the supreme administrative court declared invalid the results of a pilot electronic vote in three municipalities and ordered a rerun of the municipal elections karkkila kauniainen and vihti the system had a usability problem where the messages were ambiguous on whether the vote had been cast in a total of 232 cases 2 of votes voters had logged in selected their vote but not confirmed it and left the booth the votes were not recorded it was concluded that the voting machine is not developed any more and finnish government will follow the development of different electronic voting systems worldwide netherlands on october 30 2006 the dutch minister of the interior withdrew the license of 1187 voting machines from manufacturer sdu nv about 10 of the total number to be used because it was proven by the general intelligence and security service that one could eavesdrop on voting from up to 40 meters using van eck phreaking united states a number of problems with voting systems in florida since the 2000 presidential election fairfax county virginia november 4 2003 some voters complained that they would cast their vote for a particular candidate and the indicator of that vote would go off shortly after the premier election solutions formerly diebold election systems tsx voting system disenfranchised many voters in alameda and san diego counties during the march 2 2004 california presidential primary due to nonfunctional voter card encoders in napa county california march 2 2004 an improperly calibrated marksense scanner overlooked 6692 absentee ballot votes instances of faulty technology and security issues surrounding these machines were documented on august 1 2001 in the brennan center at new york university law school ny university law school released a report with more than 60 examples of evoting machine failures in 26 states in 2004 and 2006 examples included spanish language ballots that were cast by voters but not counted in sacramento in 2004 in 2010 graduate students from the university of michigan hacked into the district of columbia online voting systems during an online voting mock test run and changed all the cast ballots to cater to their preferred candidates this voting system was being tested for military voters and overseas citizens allowing them to vote on the web and was scheduled to run later that year it only took the hackers a team of computer scientists thirtysix hours to find the list of the governments passwords and break into the system problems in the united states general elections 2006 during early voting in miami hollywood and fort lauderdale florida in october 2006 three votes intended to be recorded for democratic candidates were displaying as cast for republican election officials attributed it to calibration errors in the touch screen of the voting system in pennsylvania a computer programming error forced some to cast paper ballots in indiana 175 precincts also resorted to paper counties in those states also extended poll hours to make up for delays cuyahoga county ohio the diebold computer server froze and stopped counting votes then the printers jammed so paper copies could not be retrieved for many votes and there was no way to be sure of the accuracy of the votes when the votes were being counted waldenburg arkansas the touch screen computer tallied zero votes for one mayoral candidate who confirmed that he certainly voted for himself and therefore there would be a minimum of one vote this is a case of disappearing votes on touchscreen machines sarasota florida there was an 18000person undervote in a congressional election found that the undervote was not caused by software error poor ballot design was widely acknowledged as the cause of the undervote 2008 united states elections virginia tennessee and texas touch screen voting machines flipped votes in early voting trials humboldt county california a security flaw erased 197 votes from the computer database california toptobottom review in may 2007 california secretary of state debra bowen commissioned a toptobottom review of all electronic voting systems in the state she engaged computer security experts led by the university of california to perform security evaluations of voting system source code as well as red teams running worst case election day scenarios attempting to identify vulnerabilities to tampering or error the top to bottom review also included a comprehensive review of manufacturer documentation as well as a review of accessibility features and alternative language requirements the end results of the tests were released in the four detailed secretary of state august 3 2007 resolutions for diebold election systems hart intercivic sequoia voting systems and elections systems and software inc and updated october 25 2007 revised resolutions for diebold and sequoia voting systems the security experts found significant security flaws in all of the manufacturers voting systems flaws that could allow a single nonexpert to compromise an entire election on august 3 2007 bowen decertified machines that were tested in her toptobottom view including the ess inkavote machine which was not included in the review because the company submitted it past the deadline for testing the report issued july 27 2007 was conducted by the expert red team attempting to detect the levels of technological vulnerability another report on august 2 2007 was conducted by a source code review team to detect flaws in voting system source code both reports found that three of the tested systems fell far short of the minimum requirements specified in the 2005 voluntary voting system guidelines vvsg some of the systems tested were conditionally recertified with new stringent security requirements imposed the companies in question have until the february 2008 california presidential primaries to fix their security issues and ensure that election results can be closely audited the premier election solutions formerly diebold election systems accuvotetsx voting system was studied by a group of princeton university computer scientists in 2006 their results showed that the accuvotetsx was insecure and could be installed with votestealing software in under a minute the scientists also said that machines can transmit computer viruses from one to another during normal pre and postelection activity 2000 presidential election in florida punched cards received considerable notoriety in 2000 when their uneven use in votomatic style systems in florida was alleged to have affected the outcome of the us presidential election invented by joseph p harris votomatic was manufactured for a time under license by ibm william rouverol who built the prototype and wrote patents stated that after the patents expired in 1982 lower quality machines had appeared on the market the machines used in florida had five times as many errors as a true votomatic he said punchedcardbased voting systems the votomatic system in particular use special cards where each possible hole is prescored allowing perforations to be made by the voter pressing a stylus through a guide in the voting machine a problem with this system is the incomplete punch this can lead to a smaller hole than expected or to a mere slit in the card or to a mere dimple in the card or to a hanging chad this technical problem was claimed by the democratic party to have influenced the 2000 us presidential election in the state of florida critics claimed that punched card voting machines were primarily used in democratic areas and that hundreds of ballots were not read properly or were disqualified due to incomplete punches which allegedly tipped the vote in favor of george w bush over al gore popular culture in the 2006 film man of the year starring robin williams the character played by williamsa comedic host of political talk showwins the election for president of the united states when a software error in the electronic voting machines produced by the fictional manufacturer delacroy causes votes to be tallied inaccurately in runoff a 2007 novel by mark coggins a surprising showing by the green party candidate in a san francisco mayoral election forces a runoff between him and the highly favored establishment candidatea plot line that closely parallels the actual results of the 2003 election when the privateeye protagonist of the book investigates at the behest of a powerful chinatown businesswoman he determines that the outcome was rigged by someone who defeated the security on the citys newly installed evoting system hacking democracy is a 2006 documentary film shown on hbo filmed over three years it documents american citizens investigating anomalies and irregularities with electronic voting systems that occurred during americas 2000 and 2004 elections especially in volusia county florida the film investigates the flawed integrity of electronic voting machines particularly those made by diebold election systems and culminates in the hacking of a diebold election system in leon county florida the central conflict in the mmo video game infantry resulted from the global institution of direct democracy through the use of personal voting devices sometime in the 22nd century ad the practice gave rise to a voting class of citizens composed mostly of homemakers and retirees who tended to be at home all day because they had the most free time to participate in voting their opinions ultimately came to dominate politics electronic voting manufacturers accupoll advanced voting solutions formerly shoup voting machine co bharat electronics limited india dominion voting systems canada electronics corporation of india ltd ess united states everyone counts united states hart intercivic united states microvote nedap netherlands premier election solutions formerly diebold election systems united states safevote sequoia voting systems united states smartmatic votex tm technologies elections inc canada academic efforts bingo voting prt voter punchscan certification of voting machines edemocracy electoral fraud vote counting system voting machine wikimedia commons has media related to voting machines electronic vote around the world smartmatic election assistance commission votenistgov the national institute of standards and technology help america vote act page an electronic voting case study in kca university kenya the election technology library research list a comprehensive list of research relating to technology use in elections evoting information from ace project how do we vote in india electronic voting systems at curlie npr summary of current technology status in the states of the us as of may 2008 internet voting in estonia progetto salento evoting a project for an evoting test in melpignano e martignano lecce italy designed by prof marco mancarella university of salento jardced roger pujolahull jordi castellroca jordi viejo alexandre 2012 study on pollsite voting and verification systems computers security 31 8 9891010 doi101016jcose201208001 a review of existing electronic voting systems and its verification systems in supervised environments open counting systems behind evoting voteboxtm uk online voting 